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COPYRIGHT AND TECHNOLOGY: DÉJÀ VU ALL OVER
AGAIN
RANDAL C. PICKER*
The history of copyright and technology is one of conflict as each
new means of distribution has emerged.1 We have seen this repeatedly
with piano rolls, the phonograph, radio, TV, cable TV, and, perhaps most
recently, the Internet. As has been noted before by me and others,
copyright law establishes the framework in which new tools of
distribution can be introduced.2 Copyright can kill technology, as perhaps
occurred with digital audiotape and the Audio Home Recording Act of
1992.3 And copyright itself can be changed to make possible entry as
occurred when statutory licenses were introduced to deal with Aeolian’s
possible piano roll monopoly and to make possible the rise of cable
television.
Michael Carrier considers this pattern again in his piece, “Copyright
and Innovation: The Untold Story,” where he focuses on the rise and fall
of Napster.4 Through a series of interviews with industry participants,
Carrier argues that the technology industry—meaning here the
entrepreneurs and their venture capital financers—reduced its efforts at
producing new music innovations in response to litigation over Napster.5
As noted above, the idea that copyright doctrine matters for
innovation, especially innovation in the means of distributing
copyrighted works, is reasonably well recognized. The underlying
*
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COMM. OF ACM 30 (Jan. 2012).
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See, e.g., Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
Distribution, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 423 (2002) (discussing the importance of new
products and services for the economy and the role of copyright in establishing entry
policy for new means of distribution, such as Napster, the digital video recorder, and
Web radio); Randal C. Picker, From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of
Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (2003);
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Michael A. Carrier, Copyright and Innovation: The Untold Story, 2012
WIS. L. REV. 891.
5.
Id. at 893–96.
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property regime almost certainly matters for the path of development
forward and that will be especially the case when access to a preexisting
body of copyrighted work is important for the new distribution
technology. A new distribution entrant wants access to the full body of
copyrighted works and the new technology will frequently make possible
activities that incumbents will see as infringing. That was certainly how
sheet music publishers saw piano rolls, how record companies saw radio,
and how television broadcasters saw cable TV. We are in the middle of
another replay of this as Aereo is attempting to disrupt the television
markets.6
Different intellectual property regimes are likely to result in
different economic paths forward. Compare development in two different
societies, say the current United States and an alternative society with a
copyright jubilee. In that fictional alternative, end all past copyrights and
have each work currently in copyright instantly enter the public domain.
Allow new copyrights to arise but kill off all of the old ones in one
moment. I think that there is little reason to think that economic
development in the two societies would be identical. We might imagine
that we would see a strong shift in economic activity, as measured by the
flow of venture capital dollars or new products as entrepreneurs sought
to take advantage of the new opportunities presented by the expansion of
the copyright public domain.
The real question is not whether copyright matters for innovation;
the entire history of copyright and distribution technology suggests that it
does. Instead, we need to focus on a more nuanced way in which
particular copyright settings can matter for innovation. “The Untold
Story” does very little of that. So the article is critical of the efforts of
music industry incumbents to protect their positions through litigation
and also critical of possible reforms to copyright suggested by academics
(including by me). But the article does not really say much about how
one would write a copyright statute with distribution innovation in mind.
Focus on three different copyright rules that might matter for
copyright-related distribution innovation: (1) duration, (2) secondary
liability, and (3) statutory licenses. The duration of copyright—currently
life of the author plus seventy years—is routinely criticized, but, at least
in this particular case, seems relatively unimportant. I doubt that Napster
would have mattered had it been restricted to music twenty-nine years
old and older. That is, had Napster been released during an era in which
U.S. copyright duration was a maximum of twenty-eight years and had
Napster accurately filtered in-copyright and public domain content, there
is little reason to think that Napster would have been important. The
6.
See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., No. 12-2786-cv, 2013 WL 1285591, at
*5 (2d Cir. Apr. 1, 2013).
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early adopters of Napster were the technically savvy, young people,
interested mainly in their music and not the music of a prior generation.
Copyright’s secondary liability rules are perhaps the most explicit
point where we see an effort to shape copyright’s innovation policy as
part of the organic day-to-day copyright law. We see that in both the
judge-made doctrines of secondary liability and the safe harbors built
into the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).7 Exactly how those
doctrines operate undoubtedly matters for distribution innovations like
peer-to-peer technology. The consumer electronics industry has long
asserted that the substantial noninfringing use test from Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.8 created a key safe harbor for
new product developers.9 The Sony safe harbor meant both that a firm
need not design its product to minimize copyright infringement and that
it could hope not to face liability if a relatively minimal standard was
met. The DMCA’s safe harbor—set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 512—has a
different structure but again provides a mechanism by which tech firms
can innovate without needing to gain permitted access to the underlying
copyrighted works.10
Consider the relationship between the contributory infringement
rules and statutory license rules. However we set the terms of the
contributory infringement rules, the basic structure of those rules is that
the distribution entrant can invest resources in meeting the standard and
thereby avoid liability. That means that the entrant need not negotiate for
permission to enter and need not negotiate for access to the universe of
copyrighted works. To be sure, the entrant will face risks in getting the
legal standard wrong, and, as the interviews in “The Untold Story”
suggest, those risks pose a substantial threat to an entrant in a world of
uncertain lines and just-as-uncertain litigation results.
The critical question here is how we should calibrate the tradeoffs
between copyright enforcement and open-ended innovation. Both Sony’s
test and the DMCA safe harbors tilt in favor of innovation and sacrifice
the enforcement of copyright. Defenders of those regimes often focus on
precisely the way in which the safe harbors enable innovation. The
classic vision of Silicon Valley innovation is two guys in a garage, not
two guys with their lawyer. Critics of those regimes, and “The Untold
Story” points to this work, want more tailored rules to better balance
protection of copyrights and innovation, but the discussion is precisely

7.
(2006)).
8.
9.
10.

Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 2877–86 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512
464 U.S. 417 (1984).
Id.
See § 512 (2006).
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about that tradeoff and the relationship between innovation and copyright
has not been lost on anybody participating in that discussion.
One interesting aspect of the current safe harbor approach is that it
does not tie the standards for meeting the safe harbor to the value of the
underlying copyrighted works at issue. The Sony test just asks whether
the technology is capable of substantial noninfringing uses but nothing in
satisfying that standard turns on the value of the infringement
facilitated.11 The notice-and-takedown regime in § 512 establishes a
mechanical procedure for a service provider to get the benefits of the safe
harbor.12 That process does not turn on some assessment of the value of
the copyrighted works at stake. That contrasts with a second mechanism
by which copyright addresses innovation, namely statutory licenses, such
as the so-called mechanical license in 17 U.S.C. § 115.13 Statutory
licenses represent exercises in political dealing and political power
enshrined in the statute, and are likely to be calibrated to some measure
of the value of the underlying works.
Return to the idea of the copyright jubilee, an unexpected abrupt
declaration that all prior copyrights are ended and all of the underlying
works enter the public domain. That has all the feel of a pure thought
experiment, but, in reality, the peer-to-peer (p2p) technology embodied
in Napster, coupled with the easy ripping of CDs on networked PCs,
came close to that for recorded music, especially for young, wired
consumers of music. It was not as if U.S. copyright law itself was
amended to declare such a jubilee, but Napster replayed a frequent
pattern in U.S. copyright history. New distribution entrants armed with
new tech tools almost always want to declare a copyright jubilee as to
their technology, whether that technology is a piano roll or a p2p
distribution technology such as Napster. The structure of the interaction
between the entrant and the incumbents is quite routine: “our piano rolls
actually serve to advertise your sheet music, so we certainly need not pay
you; indeed, perhaps you should be paying us.”
That pattern has been examined before and undoubtedly will be
again as new distribution technologies appear. As a new technology
emerges, we often see uses of copyrighted works that copyright holders
can legitimately challenge as infringing given the difficulties of creating
a copyright law to match all new situations. That means that copyright
law will proceed in fits and starts, as it has done through judge-made
doctrines like secondary infringement and in episodic efforts by
Congress, such as the safe harbors of the DMCA and the
situation-specific statutory licenses of our current copyright statute. In
11.
12.
13.

See Sony Corp. of America, 464 U.S. at 442.
See § 512(g)(2).
See § 115.
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each case, both the need to enforce copyrights and to enable innovation
leading to new products and services will be on the table as we try to find
the right balance between encouraging the creation of copyrighted works
and enabling new distribution technologies.

